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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JACK LAYTON and MARIAN LAY-
TON, a partnership dba DENVER 
AUTO AUCTION, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
KAY CLARK, 
Appellant. 
No. 8238 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE 
CLARENCE E. BAKER, JUDGE 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action in replevin brought by the plaintiffs, 
doing business as the Denver Auto Auction, against one, Kay 
Clark, in which it is alleged by the Complaint on file that the 
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plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of one, 
1950 Buick Special, 4 door Sedan, Motor No. 55806184. The 
facts have been stipulated to and are on file in said case. Said 
facts are briefly as follows: That the plaintiffs are in the 
business known as the Denver Auto Auction with their place 
of business in Denver, Colorado. That they are in the business 
of selling automobiles wholesale by auction to automobile 
dealers. That one, M. R. Bruce, a licensed automobile dealer, 
doing business as RaDon Auto Sales at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on or about the 3rd day of March, 195 3, purported to buy 
three automobiles from the plaintiffs including the Buick de-
scribed in the Complaint. That the said Bruce was given pos-
session of said automobiles and on Bruce's instructions, drafts 
were drawn payable in three days from the date thereof and 
a copy of which has been incorporated in the stipulation, 
said drafts being payable through the First National Bank of 
Murray, Utah. That the title to said automobiles, including 
the Buick, were attached to the drafts and said titles were 
to be delivered to said Bruce on his payment of said drafts. 
That on receiving possession of said automobiles, -the' 
said Bruce removed them to Salt Lake City and placed them 
on his used car lot where the defendant, Kay Clark, appeared 
and purchased, in the usual course of trade, the Buick described 
in the complaint. That the said M. R. Bruce never did pay 
said draft nor obtain the title to said automobile. That at 
the time of the sale by Bruce to the defendant, no inquiry was 
made by Clark as to the title of said property and no repre-
sentations were made by Bruce to Clark except those con-
tained in the purchase order, a copy of which is attached to 
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the Stipulation of Facts, the certificate of title still being in 
the possession of the plaintiffs in this action. It is the contention 
of the plaintiffs that the said M. R. Bruce had no right to 
sell said automobile, that it was not his property or right 
to possession of same as against the plaintiffs, and that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of said Buick auto-
mobile. 
Based upon these facts and the law, the lower Court 
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and from said 
judgment the defendant appeals to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED TO 
ASSERT THEIR TITLE AS AGAINST THE APPELLANT, 
AND FOR HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS 
NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE AND 
THAT HE DID NOT OBTAIN ANY TITLE AS AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENTS. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD 
THAT IN COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN 
A SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS 
A CHATTEL MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE 
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FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
STATUTE, AND THERE BEING NO COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE COLORADO STATUTE ON THIS MATTER 
THE RESERVATION OF TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT 
IS INVALID. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED TO I 
ASSERT THEIR TITLE AS AGAINST THE APPELLANT, Inion 
AND FOR HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS 
NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE AND 
THAT HE DID NOT OBTAIN ANY TITLE AS AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENTS. 
There are no Utah cases directly in point on the question 
here involved but the Utah statutes and their interpretation 
by the Supreme Court are very helpful in deciding the present 
question. 
The Court's attention is called to the provisions of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 60, Chapter 2, Section 7, 
which reads as follows: 
"60-2-7. Sale by a person not the owner. 
( 1) Subject to the provisions of this title, where 
goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, 
and who does not sell them under the authority or 
with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no 
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better title to the goods than the seller had, unless 
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded 
from denying the seller's authority to sell. 
(2) Nothing in this title, however, shall affect: 
(a) The provisions of any factors' acts, recording 
acts, or any enactment enabling the apparent owner 
of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true 
owner thereof. 
(b) The validity of any contract to sell or sale 
under any special common law or statutory power of 
sale, or under the order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction." 
The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 41, Chapter 1, 
Section 72, reads as follows: 
"41-1-72. Necessary before transfer complete.-Until 
the department shall have issued such new certi-
ficate of registration and certificate of ownership, 
delivery of any vehicle required to be registered shall 
be deemed not to have been made and title thereto 
shall be deemed not to have passed, and said intended 
transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to 
be valid or effective for any purpose except as provided 
in section 41-1-77 ." 
In connection with this case, we call the court's attention to 
the case of Swartz vs. White, reported 80 Utah 150, 13 Pac. 
( 2) 643, Utah Case 1932. In this case, the plaintiff claimed 
to be an innocent purchaser for value and brought an action 
for claim and delivery for a Buick roadster automobile against 
the defendant. The car was owned by and registered in the 
name of the defendant, Mrs. C. H. White. She was also the 
legal owner. She advertised the same for sale and a party by 
the name of M. J. Stewart appeared at her home and requested 
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permission to try and sell the car on a commission basis. She 
let him take the car to demonstrate but retained the title cer-
tificate. He returned the car on two or three occasions. At a 
later date, Stewart called on the defendant's husband at his 
place of business and told him he had a sale for the car and 
asked for the car and also the title certificate. White gave 
these to Stewart. Stewart departed with the car and the certificate j 
of ownership promising to return shortly, which he failed to 1 wa1 
do. A new certificate of ownership was issued by the Secretary 
of State in the name of M. J. Stewart as owner and Swartz 
Sales Service as legal owner. Under the evidence, Stewart 
brought the car to the place of business of Swartz and obtained 
an advance on the car in the amount of $125.00 and he turned 
the title certificate over to Swartz. White saw the automobile 
on the street and took possession of the same and Swartz 
brought this action claiming that he was the lawful owner 
and entitled to the possession of said automobile. The lower 
Court held for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court in holding 
for the defendant stated on page 645 as follows: 
" ( 1, 2) The judgment for plaintiff must be reversed 
for the reason, as we view the record, that plaintiff 
never at any time obtained title to the car nor was he 
shown to be entitled to possession. It is the general rule 
"that no one can transfer a better title than he has, 
unless some principle of estoppel comes into operation 
against the person claiming under what would other-
wise be a better title." 24 R.C.L. 3 74. So also by the 
Uniform Sales Act, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 
5132, where goods are sold by a person who is not 
the owner, and who does not sell them under the 
authority, or with the consent of the owner, the buyer 
acquires no better title than the seller had, unless the 
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owner is by his conduct precluded from denying the 
seller's authority to sell. One who acquires property 
by theft, or one who by fraud acquires possession of 
personal property for a particular purpose with the 
intention of appropriating the property to his own 
use and without any intention on the part of the owner 
to transfer title to him, cannot transfer a good title. 
24 R.C.L. 3 75." 
and again on Page 646 as follows: 
"The possession of the certificate of ownership in-
dorsed as it was by Mrs. White is not, under our 
motor vehicle law, evidence of ownership in Stewart. 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 3972, as amended by 
Laws Utah 1925, p. 266, c. 125, Section 3 (now Sec-
tion 3972XO.) The Statute provides in effect that upon 
registration of an automobile the secretary of state 
shall issue a certificate of registration and of ownership 
to the owner, and upon a transfer being made the owner 
shall indorse the certificate of ownership and deliver 
it with the certificate of registration to the new owner; 
that the certificates shall be delivered to the secretary 
of state, who, upon payment of a fee of $1, shall 
issue new certificates of registration and ownership 
to the person entitled, and that: "Until the Secretary 
of State shall have issued such new certificate of regis-
tration and certificate of ownership, as herein provided 
in sub-division (d) , delivery of such vehicle shall be 
deemed not to have been made and title thereto shall 
be deemed not to have passed and said intended trans-
fer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid 
or effective for any purpose." The words of the statute, 
italicized by us, are clear and unambiguous and un-
doubtedly mean what they say. Any claimed transfer 
from Mrs. White to Stewart was incomplete. Title 
had not passed and the transfer was not valid or ef-
fective for any purpose. Briedwell v. Henderson, 99 
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Or. 506, 195 P. 575· Parke v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, 
. ' 228 P. 435." 
In respect to the effect of the registration statutes we call 
the Court's attention to the case of Robinson vs. Poole et al., 
Missouri 1950, 232 SW (2) 807, which case held that sale 
of a motor vehicle registered in the state without accompanying 
Assignment of Title Certificate to buyer is fradulent and void 
and imposes an absolute mandatory requirement that sale be 
accompanied by such assignment to be valid. 
In connection with the White case, a rather recent Idaho 
case is called to the Court's attention, Lux vs. Lockridge, 150 
Pac. (2) 127, Idaho 1944. In this case, the plaintiff appellant 
agreed with the Gray Motor Company to trade an automobile, 
pickup truck and three trucks for a new automobile, a new 
pickup and three new trucks. Plaintiff to retain possession 
until deliveries of the new vehicles. The transaction as to the 
new automobile and pickup were completed. Somewhat later 
the Gray Motor Company took the defendant to see the 
plaintiff's trucks and one of the trucks was taken by an em-
ployee of the motor company to the dealer's garage and was 
later sold to the defendant. Shortly after this, a freeze on 
the sale of new trucks was issued by the United States Gov-
ernment and the motor company was unable to deliver a new 
truck to the plaintiff. The plaintiff requested the defendant to 
return the truck claiming it had been delivered to the dealer 
and defendant upon condition that if the plaintiff was unable 
to get a new truck, this truck was to be returned to him. The 
defendant refused, claiming that he had no knowledge of an 
agreement between the plaintiff and the motor company and 
10 
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the Court found that the plaintiff did not sell the truck to 
the defendant, that he sold it to the Gray Motor Company, 
that the defendant, Lockridge, purchased the truck from the 
Gray Motor Company and not from the plaintiff and that 
Lockridge had no knowledge of any agreement between the 
Gray Motor Company and the plaintiff, Lux, and the Court 
found that Lockridge was an innocent purchaser of the truck. 
Judgment was, nevertheless, entered for the plaintiff, Lux, 
to the defendant to deliver the truck to the plaintiff. The 
defendant appealed and the judgment was affirmed. The 
Court in deciding for the plaintiff discussed the case of Swartz 
vs. White as authority for their holding and stated as follows 
at Page 128: 
" ( 1, 2) There was a sharp conflict in the evidence 
as to whether defendant knew plaintiff retained the 
right to regain possession of his truck in the event the 
company could not deliver a new truck. There is, how-
ever, no dispute in the record that the certificate of 
title remained at all times in plaintiff's possession and 
was never transferred by him to the company or de-
fendant and that defendant received no certificate of 
title from the company or plaintiff. All were equally 
charged with notice of chapter 144, supra, providing 
that no person could "acquire any right, title, claim 
or interest in or to" a motor vehicle until the vendee 
had issued to him the certificate of title. Without, 
therefore, determining whether or not a sale without 
the transfer of the certificate is void, though urged 
by both parties pro and con to do so, we are impressed 
with the cogency of the reasoning in Swartz v. White, 
80 Utah 150, 13 P. 2d 643, to the effect that a pur-
chaser not receiving the certificate of title is not a 
bona fide purchaser for value and therefore as against 
defendant the contract existing between plaintiff and 
11 
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the company could be shown, defeating his rights to 
retain the truck.'' 
We call the Court's attention to the early annotation 
reported in 13 L.R.A. at page 717, which reads as follows: 
"A purchaser of chattels takes them, as a general 
rule, subject to whatever may turn out to be infirmities 
of the title. Farmers & M. Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 
N.Y. 568. 
And it is a rule of extended application, that no per-
son can transfer any greater title than he himself has 
in the thing transferred. 2 Kent, Com. 324; Saltus v. lll1 
Everett, 20 Wend. 267, 275; Brower v. Peabody, 13 
N.Y. 121; Peer v. Humphrey, 2 Ad. & El. 495; Dows 
v. Perrin, 16 N.Y. 3·25; Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio, 323, 
327; Whistler v. Forster, 14 C.B.N.S. 248; Ballard 
v. Burgett, 40 N.Y. 314. 
The sale of chattels by one not in possession of the 
legal title conveys to the transferee no title in the goods, 
even where the purchase is for value and in entire 
authority. Boyce v. Brockway, 31 N. Y. 490; Brower 
v. Peabody, 13 N.Y. 121; Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend. 
285; Spaulding v. Brewster, 50 Barb. 142; Dudley v. 
Hawley, 40 Barb. 397; Cobb v. Dows, 10 N.Y. 335; 
Murray v. Burline, 10 Johns. 172; Everritt v. Coffin, 
6 Wend. 604; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 270; Connah 
v. Hale, 23 Wend. 462! Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio, 323; 
La Place v. Aupoix, 1 Johns, Cas. 407; Disbrow v. 
Tenbroeck, 4 E.D. Smith, 397. F.S.R.," 
and also the law as contained in 46 American Jurisprudence, 
Page 620, Section 458, reads as follows: 
"458. Generally-It is a general rule as regards per-
sonal property that title, like a stream, cannot rise 
higher than its source; and therefore, it is a general 
12 
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principle that a seller without title cannot transfer a 
better title than he has, unless some principle of 
estoppel comes into operation against the person claim-
ing under what would otherwise be the better title, 
as where the owner by some direct and unequivocal 
act has clothed the seller with the indicia of ownership, 
or unless the seller has authority from the owner. In 
other words, the seller of property other than nego-
tiable securities can ordinarily convey no greater rights 
than he himself has." 
This matter is discussed in Blashfield, Volume 7, Section 
4357 as follows: 
"The owner of an automobile, it has been held, 
merely by reason of having delivered its possession to 
a dealer in automobiles, is not estopped to claim title 
as against a bona-fide purchaser from the dealer, even 
though the dealer was authorized by the owner to 
exhibit the automobile for the purpose of obtaining 
offers of purchase. 
The owner, when trading his automobile to a dealer, 
may properly reserve title until the performance of 
certain conditions, such as furnishing of the proper 
title papers, and hence a sale of the automobile by 
the dealer passes no title, since he had none to pass. 
* * * 
A person who purchases an automobile from a dealer 
without obtaining the title papers, or in reliance on 
the dealers promise to furnish the title papers later 
without making any effort to ascertain the true owner-
ship, acquires no title as against the owner, where the 
owner, for example, had attached the title papers to a 
draft and had sold and delivered the automobile to 
the dealer subject to payment of the draft, which was 
never paid." 
13 
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The same subject is discussed in Williston on Sales, Section 
313, which reads as follows: 
"Although intrusting possession to another may 
lead an innocent third person to believe the possessor 
is the owner, no court has gone so far as to hold that 
the mere intrusting with possession would preclude 
the owner from asserting his title. If the owner of 
goods is responsible for or cognizant of no other 
deceptive circumstances, it is an entirely proper thing 
for him to intrust another with the goods either for the 
advantage of the owner or of the possessor, and the 
law has never attempted to debar the owner from so 
doing. * * * " 
Section 3~14 deals with the possession intrusted to one who 
habitually sells such goods. In this section, Williston discusses 
the English rule and disagrees with the same. The English 
rule apparently holds that title passes to the purchaser, under 
such circumstances. Section 315 of Williston reads as follows: 
"It is a step beyond the situation considered in the 
preceding section if the owner has not only intrusted 
possession to one who is in the habit of selling such 
goods, but has given him authority to exhibit the goods 
to possible purchasers and obtain offers from them. 
Even in this case an innocent purchaser is not protected, 
but slight additional circumstances may turn the scale." 
In Section 316, Williston discusses where possession is in-
trusted :with indecia of title, and we call to the Court's atten· 
tion that Bruce was not given any indecia of title whatsoever 
to these automobiles. He had bare possession only. Section 
320 of Williston reads as follows: 
"A few states and only a few have passed factors 
Acts. California, Montana, and North Dakota have 
14 
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identical provisions originating in the California code. 
A Factor has ostensible authority to deal with the prop-
erty of his principal as his own in transactions with 
persons not having notice of the actual ownership." 
This last section is importan,t particularly in view of the holding 
of California and one or two other cases where they have held 
against the plaintiff in an action similar to the one at bar. 
California has held that the person in the possession, as 
Bruce was in this case, was a factor, and based on that, per-
mitted persons buying the car to retain the same, but Utah 
has no such statute and, therefore, the California holding 
can clearly be distinguished under Utah law. 
The case most nearly in point to the case m question 
is Deahl vs. Thomas, Texas Appeals 1949, 224 S. W. (2) 
293. In this case the facts are substantially as follows: On or 
about October 29, 1948, the appellee sold a new Mercury 
Club Coupe to P. C. Hicks, a dealer in used automobiles, for 
a consideration of $2950.00, subject to payment of a draft 
for $2950.00 in payment of the automobile drawn by Hicks 
on a Clarenden bank, payable to appellee. Upon taking pos-
session of the automobile at Clarenden, Hicks sent the draft 
to appellee at his home in Lamey, Missouri where it was de-
posited by appellee, with papers evidencing title to said auto-
mobile attached thereto, in a Missouri bank for collection in 
due course. On or about October 30, 1948, and before draft 
in question had been presented for payment, Hicks sold the 
automobile to appellant for a consideration of $2150.00 in 
cash, together with a trade-in value of $1125.00 on a used car. 
Appellant took possession of new automobile with the un-
derstanding Hicks would supply papers in a few days. The 
15 
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draft was never paid, although presented to Hicks twice. When 
appellee learned appellant had possession of the automobile, 
he filed suit for recovery. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff 
and affirmed. On page 295, the Court held: 
"While appellant complains in several points of 
error presented of various irregularities of procedure 
in the trial court, the controlling issue to be determined 
is the question of who holds legal title and the right 
of possession of the automobile. Appellant contends 
that he is protected under the law of estoppel under 
the facts in this case. Yet, under his own admission 
as a witness, he purchased the automobile upon the 
promise only of Hicks that the necessary papers of 
title would be delivered to him later. He inquired about 
such papers later and Hicks continued to put him off. 
Neither Hicks nor appellant ever received such papers. 
There is no evidence even tending to show that ap-
pellee concealed or attempted to conceal the title papers 
to the automobile, or did anything to prevent their 
inspection by anybody. According to appellant's own 
testimony, he knew legal title to the automobile was 
not delivered to him when he took possession of it 
and he made no effort at the time he paid Hicks for 
the automobile and took possession of it to determine 
the true ownership of the automobile. Appellant could 
have ascertained the true ownership of the automobile 
at the time he paid for it if he had exercised reasonable 
diligence. Under the record before us, it is our opinion 
that the law of estoppel does not apply in this case, 
Holland vs. Blanchard, Tex. Civ. App. 262 S.W. 97; 
Pac. Finance Corp. v. Gilkerson, Tex. Civ. App. 217 
s.w. (2) 440.)" 
On Page 296 the Court held as follows: 
"Section 27 of the certificate of Title Act, Article .:1 ~ t; 
1436, Vernons Annotated Penal Code, requires the 11raei 
16 
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procurement of a certificate of Title as a condition 
precedent to the right to transfer a motor vehicle. 
Section 53 of the same act provides that all sales made 
in violation of this act shall be void and no title shall· 
pass until the provisions of this act have been com-
plied with. Mere possession of property does not war-
rant an assumption of legal ownership. The rule is 
well established that one who buys property must at 
his own peril ascertain the ownership. Seigal v. War-
rick, Tex. App. 214 S.W. (2) 883, and other authori-
ties there cited. It has been held that it is the duty of 
one who purchases a motor vehicle imported into 
. Texas to investigate and see that the seller of the 
same has complied with the Texas Certificate Law. 
Ball Bros. Trucking Co. vs. Sorenson, Tex. Civ. App. 
191 S.W. (2) 908, Appellant did not make such an 
investigation in this case or any other investigation 
about ownership of the automobile. He relied wholly 
on the promise of Hicks to procure the papers later. 
He was therefore derelict in performing the duty re-
quired of him in order to protect his best interest and 
he acted at his own peril in purchasing the automobile 
and paying for it merely on the promise of Hicks to 
furnish title at some later date." 
See also the case of Onwiler vs. Burtrum, decided in 1950, 
a Texas case reported in 236 SW (2) 157, and the case of 
Fisher vs. Bullington, 50 So. (2) 91, La. 1951. In this case 
the plaintiff brought action in replevin to recover a Plymouth 
automobile in the possession of the defendant alleging him 
to be the owner. One John D. Cole negotiated for the pur-
chase of the automobile and gave a check to the plaintiff 
drawn on Twin City Bank of North Little Rock, Arkansas. 
The plaintiff attached the title papers to the check and for-
warded to the bank for collection. The check returned with 
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title papers to the plaintiff. The car later was sold by Cole to 
one James W. McKenzie, Jr., and by him to the defendant. 
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and on Page 92 the 
Court says: 
"Plaintiff's action is predicated upon the contention 
that his negotiation with Cole was a conditional sale, 
as a consequence of which Cole was not vested with 
Title nor was the Plaintiff divested of Title to the 
vehicle in question until and unless the purchase price 
represented by the check delivered to the Plaintiff 
by Cole was paid. It logically follows if Plaintiff's 
contention be true that the dishonoring of the check 
was evidence of the failure of fulfillment of the alleged 
conditional sale and that Plaintiff continued to be 
vested with ~itle to the automobile despite the ma-
chinations of Cole and his associates * * * . 
While we have some question as to whether the 
transaction between Plaintiff and Cole can be properly 
denominated as a conditional sale, we are nonetheless 
firmly of the opinion that the precautions taken by 
Plaintiff were sufficient to confirm him in the con-
tinuance of his Title." 
See also Ohio Motors vs. Russell Willis, Inc., a Ten-
nessee case decided in March, 1952, 246 SW (2) 962. The 
most recent case in this respect is the case of Slaton vs. Lamb, 
Alabama 1954, 71 So. (2) 289. In that case suit was brought 
by the seller against an innocent purchaser from the buyer 
to recover automobile. The plaintiff through an auto auction 
in Tennessee sold to one T. C. McDonald the automobile in 
question. He gave a check in payment and a written agreement 
was entered into which, among other matters, it was agreed that 
title to the automobile should remain with the seller until 
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the check had been paid. Buyer was given possession. He took 
the automobile to Alabama and sold it on an auction to the 
defendant, Slaton, an automobile dealer, who then resold the 
car and the car could not be located. The Court held for the 
plaintiff and on Page 292 says: 
"In the case at bar it is not a question of the purpose 
of the sale by Lamb to McDonald. It is a question 
of whether ther~ is in fact a sale. As a matter of fact 
the sale was never made because the cash was not 
paid * * * In the case at bar, Lamb never parted with 
the legal Title and never authorized anyone else to 
sell so as to pass the title. A purchaser from McDonald, 
therefore, could not acquire the legal title which is 
necessary to constitute one a bona :fide purchaser." 
In the case of Pugh vs. Camp, Ark. 1948, 210 S.W. (2) 
120, the appellant traded a Ford to one Haynes, a used car 
dealer, for a Chevrolet. The appellant kept title papers on 
the Ford until he received title to the Chevrolet. Haynes sold 
the Ford. The appellant brought this action in replevin for 
the Ford, and the Court said at Page 121: 
"If the appellant did reserve the title to the Ford 
car, its sale by Haynes passed no title, since he had 
none to pass, and title can be reserved by parole." 
Crawford Finance Company vs. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 
50, 25 N.E. (2) 306. In a case of replevin in a syllabus by the 
Court as follows: 
"1. The holder of a chattel mortgage on, and a 
manufacturers certificate of title to an automobile 
given him by a dealer, has a lien on the automobile 
superior to any claim of a subsequent buyer of it from 
that dealer. 
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3•. The Ohio certificate of title law for the registra-
tion of title to motor vehicles, Section 6290-2 to 
6290-20 general code, is exclusive, and the only way 
a buyer can acquire a good title to such a vehicle from 
a dealer is by procuring a certificate of title from the 
proper clerk of Court as provided in Sections 6290-3, 
6290-4 and 6290-5 General Code." 
Payne vs. Strothkamp, Missouri 1941, 153 S.W. (2) 402. 
In an action of replevin to recover an automobile from de-
fendant who purchased it from a third party to whom plaintiff 
intrusted automobile for demonstration to a prospective buyer, 
the Court directed a verdict that plaintiff was entitled to pos-
session of the automobile, held proper under the evidence 
that the automobile originally belonged to plaintiff and that 
a certificate of title had been issued to him and that plaintiff 
had not assigned the certificate as provided by statute. 
State Bank of Black Diamond vs. Johnson, 104 Wash-
ington 340, 177 Pac. 340. This is a replevin action wherein 
the plaintiff seeks recovery of an automobile claiming title 
of same by virtue of a conditional sales contract executed 
by one Grant-Coffin-Campbell Company, as vendor, an as-
signment of all the rights of the company under the con-
ditional sales contract and forfeiture of vendee's rights. The 
defendants, Johnson and Dahl, claim lawful possession and 
title to the automobile as innocent purchasers. 
In September of 1917, the company then being the owner 
of the automobile and in possession of the same, entered into 
a conditional sales contract with A. L. Skonnord. This con-
tract was assigned to the bank assigning all right, title and 
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interest in and to the note and contract. Skonnord failed to 
pay the balance and returned the automobile to the company. 
On October 25, 1917, Johnson and Dahl entered into a 
conditional sales contract with the cqmpany for the purchase 
of a second hand car of the same general description as the 
car described in the conditional sales contract above set out but 
not specifically describing said car. On the following day, 
Campbell delivered the car covered by the conditional sales 
contract and gave the bill of sale in the name of "Campbell 
Motor Company, Inc." There was no such company and 
Johnson and Dahl paid the balance due on their contract. On 
December 1, 1917, the bank discovered the sale and then 
demand was made on Johnson and Dahl to return the car 
to the bank. They refused. Thereafter, this action was brought 
and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and affirmed 
on appeal. On Page 343, the Court says: 
"Johnson and Dahl claimed to be innocent purchas-
ers, also contended the company was engaged in 
business of selling automobiles and this automobile 
was purchased by Johnson and Dahl at its place of 
business, it being in possession and the apparent owner 
of the automobile. 
It is true that possession of personal property is some 
evidence of title thereto by the one in possession of it, 
but to sustain Johnson's and Dahl's claim of title in 
this case it would be necessary to go to the extent of 
invoking in their favor the doctrine that a sale in 
market overt vests good title in the vendee though the 
vendor had no title, applicable under certain conditions 
in England. 35 Cyc. 358. If the vendor has no title, 
the vendee acquires none, unless the one having title 
has by act or neglect estopped himself from disputing 
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the vendees claim of title so acquired. It seems plain 
that there was no such estopple here. * * * The fact 
still remains that neither, Grant-Coffin-Campbell Com-
pany, Campbell.Motor. Compa?y, nor Edward P. Camp-
bell had any nght, htle or 1nterest whatever in the 
automobile at the time one or other of them assumed 
to sell it to Jo?nson and Dahl. Whatever view may 
be taken of th1s case other than the question of the 
Bank acquiring title to the automobile by assignment 
of the conditional sales contract, there remains the 
fact that Johnson and Dahl's vendor had no title to 
convey and the want of estopple preventing the Bank 
from asserting its title to the automobile." , 
Judgment affirmed. 
Eatonville State Bank vs. Marshall, Wash. 1932. 17 Pac. 
( 2) 14. This is an action of replevin by the Eatonville Bank 
against Marshall, from Judgment of Dismissal. The plaintiff 
appeals and the case was reversed. 
The appellant was the owner of a 1929 Ford acquired 
from a Ford dealer in satisfaction of a debt. In order to 
realize on this car, he turned it over to the Kirkland Motor 
Company, a dealer in Fords, giving them permission to ex-
hibit and demonstrate the car to prospective purchasers but 
no sale was to be made without appellant's approval. There-
after, Kirkland Motor Company let one of its salesmen take 
the automobile to Seattle on two occasions. When there he 
exhibited it to the respondent, a second hand car dealer, 
who, on the second visit, purchased the same, paying the 
salesman $400.00 and receiving a bill of sale, which the sales-
man signed as owner and seller. The salesman was never 
heard of thereafter and he never made an accounting to the 
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Kirkland Motor Company. The respondent relied on the 
defense of innocent purchaser. Judgment for the defendant 
and was reversed on appeal. 
An examination of the annotation cited by the appellant 
( 47 A.L.R. 85) shows numerous statements supporting the 
position of the respondents in this action. For example, we 
quote from the paragraph on Page 88 of the annotation: 
"It has been admitted in Pennsylvania in a case in-
volving a bailment lease of motor trucks to a dealer, 
that if the bailor permits the bailee so to act with 
the property (other than having possession), or so 
clothes him with apparent ownership as to mislead 
or deceive the public, an estoppel may arise against 
the owner, but it is held that such conduct must affirm-
atively appear from the evidence. Leitch v. Sanford 
Motor Truck Co. (1924) 279 Pa. 160, 123 Atl. 658. 
And it is held in this case that the fact that the bailee 
put the truck on exhibition in the salesroom where 
he was engaged in buying and selling the vehicles 
would not convert the bailment into a conditional sale, 
or estop the owner from asserting his title." 
The annotation also refers to an Idaho case, Peasley vs. Noble, 
1910, 17 Idaho 686, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 107 Pacific 402. In 
light of that case, the Court's attention is called to the case 
of Lux vs. Lockridge, supra, showing that in case of a bail-
ment or the delivery of mere possession of a chattel a subse-
quent purchaser does not acquire a right as against the true 
owner of the property. 
The appellant relies upon two Utah cases. The first is the 
case of Harrison vs. Auto Securities, which is reported in 57 
A.L.R. 3-88, followed by an annotation entitled: 
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"Right of purchaser from agent or dealer in posses-
sion of article for purpose of demonstration or solici-
tation, without actual authority to sell." (Italics 
added.) 
The Harrison case is strictly a case of agency. The owner of 
the legal title of the property in question entrusted the same 
to their agent who in turn sold it to the plaintiff. The Court 
on Page 389 says: 
"M. L. Graham Company retained title to the auto-
mobile until the balance of the purchase price was 
paid. The M. L. Graham Company transferred this 
contract of sale to the Auto Securities Company and 
in the transfer guaranteed the payment of the debt. 
In March, 1925, the M. L. Graham Company re-
possessed the said car and had it in its place of busi-
ness in Salt Lake City. * * * One G. A. Clark was 
a member of the firm of the Clark-Lavan Motor Com-
pany. This company was dealing in automobiles at 
Price, Utah, and was the agent of the M. L. Graham 
Company for the sale of the Gray sedan. It appears 
from the record that there was some written contract 
existing between the Graham Company and the Clark-
Lavan Motor Company respecting this agency." (Italics 
added.) 
Again on Page 390, the Court states: 
"It is likewise undisputed that the Clark-Lavan Mo-
tor Company maintained a place for the retail of 
automobiles at Price, Utah, and also that they were 
the agents under some arrangement with the M. L. 
Graham Company for the sale of the Gray car at and 
prior to the date when this sale was consummated." 
(Italics added.) 
It is submitted, therefore, that this case is in no way in 
point to the case before the Court as there is nothing in the 
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Stipulation to indicate any agency extshng between the re-
spondent and the RaDon Auto Sales. The facts as set out in 
the Stipulation are to the contrary. It is submitted, therefore, 
that the Harrison case does not assist the appellant in this 
action. Further, the Court's attention is called to the annota-
tion found in 57 A.L.R. 388, reading on Page 393, as follows: 
"It is a principle of both the common and the civil 
law, that no one can transfer better title to personal 
property than he has, unless some element of estoppel 
comes into operation against the person claiming under 
what would otherwise be the better title. 24 R.C.L. 3 73. 
The mere possession of chattels by whatever means 
acquired, if there is no other evidence of property or 
authority to sell from the true owner, will not enable 
the possessor to give a good title as against the former. 
24 R.C.L. 375. Accordingly, the rule is that mere pos-
session of personal property by an agent or servant 
does not confer upon him ostensible authority to sell 
it, and a sale under these circumstances does not confer 
title as against the principal, even though the buyer 
is a bona fide purchaser." (Italics added.) 
And pursuing the annotation further, we find cases such as 
the case of Royle vs. Worcester Buick Company, 243 Mass. 
143, 137 N.E. 531, referred to on Page 394, the facts are some-
what similar to the case at bar, they hold that the true owner 
may recover the chattel. Also the Court's attention is called 
to the statement at Page 395, which reads as follows: 
"In England, and in many jurisdictions in this coun-
try, statutes commonly known as the Factors' Act have 
been enacted for the protection of persons who in 
good faith, and for value, purchase property intrusted 
to the possession of a particular class of commercial 
agents." 
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And where such statutes have been enacted, the Courts have 
held contrary to the position taken by the plaintiffs in this 
case. Going along in the annotation, Page 395, the Court's 
attention is called to the case of Hamilton Mach. & Tool Co. 
vs. Mechanic's Mach. Co., 179 Ill. App. 145, in which the 
result is reached as contended for by the respondent in this 
action. 
The other Utah case cited in the appellant's brief is the 
case of Jones vs. the Commercial Investment Trust, 228 Pacifiic 
896. It is contended by the respondent that this case is not 
in point. This is a case of the so-called floor planning of auto-
mobiles. The automobile company, namely Naylor-Woodruff 
Motor Company, was purchasing automobiles for the factory 
and the same were financed and floor planned by the Com-
mercial Investment Trust. The automobile dealer received a 
bill of sale for each automobile, and on receipt of the same, 
he paid 20% of the purchase price plus freight. The title 
to the automobile was transferred to the :finance company 
under an instrument called a Negotiable Trust Receipt, and 
this instrument provided that the dealer should display and 
sell the automobiles and that on their sale he was then to 
transmit the purchase price to the :finance company and receive 
the title. The automobiles received in that case were received 
by the dealer by October of 1922 and the dealer had until 
December 1, 1922 in which to pay for the car in question. The 
same was sold to an innocent purchaser. The dealer went 
broke and failed to transmit the purchase price to the finance 
company. The Court held that the buyer was entitled to the 
car for the reason that the car was left with the dealer for 
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the specific purpose of selling the same and the finance com-
pany was estopped to claim title to the car as against the innlo-
cent purchaser. It is submitted that there are no such facts 
present in the case before the Court. The RaDon Auto Sales 
Company was not given authority to sell this automobile, it 
had no bill of sale or any document of any kind which would 
mislead any innocent purchaser. It was not being financed by 
the plaintiffs in this action. There was no floor plan arrange-
ment and under the facts of the Stipulation, there is nothing 
to indicate that the plaintiffs intended the RaDon Auto Sales 
Company to offer to display this car for sale until the draft had 
been picked up and title delivered to the RaDon Auto Sales 
Company. The RaDon Auto Sales had bare naked possession 
only, which the annotations above referred to say is not suf-
ficient. 
The general proposition of law as cited from American 
Jurisprudence, Blashfield and Williston, supra, cite cases in-
volving watches, hogs, furniture and innumerable articles of 
personal property and in all of these cases the so-called pur-
chaser has no means of determining the title to the property 
which they are acquiring. In the instant case, we have the 
title statutes of the State of Utah to protect all parties and 
as it is pointed out in the case of Dehl vs. Thomas, supra, 
the Appellant should have been charged with some respon-
sibility in determining whether Bruce had a right to sell the 
automobile in question. The means was available to him and 
certainly he could and should not stand in any stronger po-
sition than the purchaser of one of the innumerable articles 
of personal property mentioned above. 
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Out state in adopting the uniform statutes regarding con-
ditional sales as pointed out above, provided that: 
"Where goods are sold by a person who is not ~e 
owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the 
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer 
acquires no better title to the goods than the seller 
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct 
precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell." 
Title 60, Chapter 2, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953." 
and our Supreme Court has indicated that this and the regis-
tration statutes are not mere window dressing. 
The Utah Court, in the case of Swartz vs. White, supra, 
and the Court of our neighboring state, Idaho, in the case of 
Lux vs. Lockridge, supra, hav~ held that these recording 
statutes mean what they say and to follow the reasoning and 
argument of the appellant in this brief and to follow the de-
cisions of the cases cited by the appellant means in effect that 
the registration statutes are wiped off the books, and statutes 
like ours covering conditional sales above referred to will 
have in effect been judicially repealed, in the case of auto-
mobiles. 
It has become an eccepted fact that one who buys a piece 
of real property without checking the title does so at his peril. 
It is true that personal property is different than real property, 
but in considering the registration statutes all of the safe-
guards have been set up to protect the public in acquiring auto-
mobiles, the same as in regard to real property. For this Court 
to say that the fact that a person buys a car from a used car 
dealer eliminates the necessity of checking the title of an 
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automobile seems to do violence to the registration statutes. 
In this respect it is conceded that in some of the reported cases 
the Courts have in effect stated that the registration statutes 
have not been enacted for this purpose, but it is the position 
of the respondents in this action that the vendor and vendee 
of an automobile have a right to rely upon the registration 
statutes of the state and in this case the Denver Auto Auction 
when they attached the title to the draft with the understand-
ing with Bruce that the automobiles would not be placed 
upon his lot until these drafts had been honored and the 
titles picked up that they, the Denver Auto Auction, had a 
right to assume that these certificates of title meant something 
more than a mere scrap of paper and that they were entitled 
to the protection that the registration statutes said they had 
in retaining the certificates of title. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD 
THAT IN COLORADO A RESERVATION OF TITLE IN 
A SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IS REGARDED AS 
A CHATTEL MORTGAGE, AND IS REQUIRED TO BE 
FILED AS REQUIRED BY THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
STATUTE, AND THERE BEING NO COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE COLORADO STATUTE ON THIS MATTER 
THE RESERVATION OF TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT 
IS INVALID. 
The Appellant for the first time in this case raises the 
question of the Colorado Statute or law. It was never pleaded 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and never raised in the lower Court. We submit, therefore, that 
even assuming the law to be as stated by the appellant this 
Court cannot consider this matter; and the Court's attention 
is called to the 20 American Jurisprudence, Page 69, Sections 
46 and 47, and to the Utah case of Dickson vs. Mullings, 
66 Utah 282, 241 Pacific Reporter, 840 at Page 842, the Court 
holds: 
"Whether the state of New York has a statute on 
the subject is not shown. No such or any statute of 
New York is either pleaded or proved. It, of course, is 
well settled that state courts cannot take judicial notice 
of laws or statutes of a sister state. It also is well 
settled in this jurisdiction (American Oak Leather Co. 
v. Union Bank, 9 Utah, 87, 33 P. 246; Dignan v. Nel-
son, 26 Utah, 186, 72 P. 936; Stanford v. Gray, 42 
Utah, 228, 129 P. 423, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 989; Grow 
v. Railroad Co., 44 Utah 160, 138 P. 398, Ann. Cas. 
1915B, 481) that, in the absence of proof, it will be 
presumed that the law of another state is the same as 
the law of the forum and the court will administer 
and apply the law of the jurisdiction until the law of 
the situs is shown. Thus, in the absence of proof, it 
will be presumed that the law of New York on the 
subject is the same as the law of Utah." 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted, therefore, that Bruce, the used car dealer, 
had only naked possession of the automobile in question. He 
was given possession subject to the payment of a draft and 
never receiving title to the automobile, there never was a sale 
by the plaintiff, in this action, to Bruce. The transaction was 
never completed. The title of the automobile was attached 
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to the draft, sent to the bank of Bruce's designation and Bruce 
did not honor the draft and acquire the title. Bruce did not 
have anything to indicate he was the owner of this automobile 
other than possession. No registration certificate or bill of 
sale, nothing that would mislead the appellant in this action 
to believe that he, Bruce, owned the automobile and had the 
right to sell it. The appellant made no inquiries as he should 
have done as has been pointed out in the cases cited in this 
brief to Bruce's right to sell this automobile; and under the 
cases cited by the Respondent he could not have been and 
is not a bona fide purchaser for value of the automobile in 
question. It is submitted, therefore, that the judgment of 
the lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
910 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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